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After its sudden outbreak in late 2019, the new coronavirus disease (COVID-19) quickly spread around the world. The virus causes respiratory illness and poses major and immedi-
ate health threats, which strongly disrupted individuals’ lives and the 
functioning of whole societies. The virus spreads through droplets of 
saliva and discharge from the nose, and transmission can be slowed by 
strict hygiene practices and limiting social contact1. Such mitigative 
actions require individual citizens to suddenly change their lifestyles 
in drastic ways2,3. Based on experiences with global sustainability 
crises (for example, climate change), such changes seem however 
improbable to achieve. It could therefore appear that the prospects of 
society dealing effectively with COVID-19 were rather bleak.
Yet, in multiple instances, public responses to COVID-19 have 
been remarkably well-coordinated, rapid and forceful, particularly 
at early stages of the crises. For instance, during early COVID-19 
outbreaks, some countries enforced strict lockdowns (for example, 
China, Italy, New Zealand, Philippines and South Africa). Many 
schools and businesses were shut, and many individuals engaged 
in strict hygiene practices, social distancing and self-quarantining, 
which all involve substantial personal and social costs4,5. These 
responses are even more striking given that most individuals feel 
that risks associated with contracting the virus are greater for others 
than for themselves6,7. Also, knowledge about the virus and its miti-
gation was, and still is, very uncertain and tentative. How can we 
explain this strong public engagement in these often drastic mitiga-
tive actions? And, importantly, what can we learn from this experi-
ence to promote actions to mitigate COVID-19 and other urgent 
global threats requiring similarly prosocial actions, such as global 
environmental crises?
We suggest that the relatively rapid and forceful prosocial 
responses to COVID-19 may partly be explained by strong personal 
norms to take action, reflecting strong feelings of being personally 
responsible and morally compelled to act8. A substantial literature 
has established various factors that activate and strengthen personal 
norms8,9. We propose that many such factors were strongly engaged 
in instances where early responses to COVID-19 were rapid and 
forceful. For many global environmental crises, these factors seem 
to be far less apparent and countered by other influences, possibly 
explaining why public responses to global environmental crises are 
typically less powerful.
Here, we elaborate on which factors may have strengthened per-
sonal norms in the COVID-19 crisis, and examine how personal 
norms for pro-environmental action could be strengthened in a 
similar way. We first describe what personal norms are, their ori-
gins, and why they are key to translating the concerns, beliefs and 
emotions elicited by a threat into concrete actions. We then out-
line how in various contexts the early COVID-19 crisis may have 
strengthened personal norms, and engaged the conditions under 
which personal norms translate into action. We consider the ways 
that the pandemic and global environmental crises and how they are 
managed are similar and different. On the basis of this, we extract 
lessons from the early COVID-19 crisis for promoting sustainabil-
ity, and provide a research agenda to identify how personal norms 
can be strengthened to promote mitigative actions. Importantly, our 
theory-driven approach moves beyond ad hoc explanations, result-
ing in more generalizable insights that are pressingly needed to 
effectively respond to global crises. Even if in the end not all of our 
arguments prove correct, strong grounding in theory will encourage 
cumulative understanding for future crises.
Personal norms are key to action
Personal norms are internalized personal standards for what is mor-
ally the right thing to do. They invoke a personal responsibility and 
moral obligation to take prosocial action8,9, which seems just the 
kind of action that is needed to mitigate global crises. Specifically, 
many people feel that primarily others rather than themselves are 
impacted by global crises, including COVID-196,7 and global envi-
ronmental crises like climate change and pollution10,11. Hence, indi-
vidual responses to global crises seem to involve prosocial actions12: 
actions that are believed as primarily having benefits for others and 
society, while having limited personal benefits, and sometimes even 
having substantial personal costs.
Personal norms reflect an intrinsic motivation to take prosocial 
action; individuals personally want and feel the need to under-
take such actions8. When individuals act in accordance with their 
personal norms, they typically feel proud, good and true to them-
selves. In contrast, not acting in line with one’s personal norms often 
induces feelings of guilt and being untrue to oneself8,13. As personal 
norms reflect intrinsic motivations, they are a more stable base for 
action than many extrinsic factors8, such as social norms, for which 
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effectiveness strongly depends on their salience and personal rel-
evance14. Indeed, personal norms are typically found to be among 
the strongest and most consistent predictors of prosocial action15,16.
The literature shows that personal norms are at the end of a 
causal chain and are influenced by several factors (see Fig. 1)9,13. A 
crisis can affect factors in the chain, and thereby influence personal 
norms and thus the likelihood that someone will support or take 
mitigating actions. For example, value–belief–norm theory indicates 
that personal values affect the extent to which people are aware that 
a crisis might have negative consequences for things they value17. 
This in turn affects how much responsibility individuals ascribe to 
themselves for contributing to the crisis, and perceive themselves as 
being able to contribute to the mitigation of the crisis. This, together 
with individuals’ perception of what other people do, appreciate and 
value (for example, perceived group values and social norms), influ-
ence personal norms18. We elaborate on these factors below.
Personal values. Values are general and stable goals that function as 
guiding principles in people’s lives19. People with stronger altruistic 
values (that is, caring for others and social justice) and biospheric 
values (that is, caring for nature and the environment) are likely 
to have stronger personal norms to take action to mitigate global 
crises8,20. Studies across a variety of nations demonstrate that many 
individuals strongly endorse altruistic and biospheric values, sug-
gesting there is a relatively strong value base for actions to mitigate 
global crises18. Altruistic and biospheric values mostly affect per-
sonal norms indirectly, through factors described below.
Awareness of consequences. One way values influence personal 
norms is through individuals’ awareness of consequences9,21, reflect-
ing the extent to which individuals acknowledge (that is, cognitive 
awareness) and worry about (that is, affective appraisal) the adverse 
consequences of global crises. Awareness of consequences is an 
assessment of the risks to things that are valued8. It is shaped by 
how well consequences are known, how easily consequences can 
be observed, how rapid and severe the consequences are and what 
is communicated about the consequences. The more individuals 
acknowledge and worry about the possible adverse consequences of 
a global problem, the more likely they have strong personal norms. 
Individuals with strong altruistic and biospheric values are more 
attuned to negative consequences for others, society and the envi-
ronment, and are therefore more likely to acknowledge and worry 
about the negative consequences of a global problem9,22. Thus, 
awareness of consequences links values to personal norms.
Ascription of responsibility. Even if one is aware of adverse conse-
quences of a crisis, personal norms may remain weak if the crisis is 
seen as caused by forces outside of one’s control. Indeed, personal 
norms are generally stronger the more people believe their actions 
contribute to the crisis8,9,21. In contrast, personal norms are weaker 
when people feel that others, for example governments and private 
organizations, are responsible for the problems and their solution23. 
Yet, the latter could lead to a personal norm to influence the actions 
of those powerful others, perhaps through protests and political 
action9.
Efficacy beliefs. In addition to ascribing some responsibility to the 
self, personal norms for action require that individuals believe they 
can engage in actions to mitigate the crisis (that is, self-efficacy)21,24, 
and that such actions will improve the situation (that is, outcome 
efficacy, sometimes also referred to as response efficacy)8,9,21. When 
individuals see no better alternatives to current behaviours, perceive 
alternatives but see no practical means to carry them out, or see 
alternatives but perceive their impacts to be inconsequential, effi-
cacy beliefs and therefore personal norms are likely weak24.
Social factors. Perception of expectations and actions of others 
can also affect personal norms, particularly when these others are 
members of a group that an individual strongly identifies with12,25,26. 
Indeed, observing and learning from others strongly influences 
human action14,27,28. Key social factors include perceptions of others’ 
values (that is, perceived group values)18,25,29, of what others would 
approve (that is, injunctive norms) and of what others actually do 
(that is, descriptive norms)14,30. Such social factors reflect what rel-
evant others think is important, right and sensible, that could be 
internalized into personal norms31. Moreover, they may influence 
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Fig. 1 | Theoretical framework. Theoretical framework of pathways leading to mitigative actions. Black arrows and blue boxes represent the relationships 
that we hypothesize will lead to initial responses to global crises, and are the focus in this Perspective. Grey arrows represent relationships that we expect 
will develop based on these initial responses, and are discussed in the section ‘Future directions’. Thicker arrows represent stronger relationships.
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personal norms indirectly. For example, descriptive norms indicat-
ing many people are acting may enhance individuals’ outcome effi-
cacy and in turn strengthen personal norms.
Perceptions of what others value, approve and do may be par-
ticularly critical in global crises, given that actions to mitigate such 
crises are often taken to produce collective benefits. So, when oth-
ers—the beneficiaries of collective action—seem not to care about 
or act upon a crisis, feelings of moral obligations to act oneself are 
likely weakened. These are the dynamics of the tragedy of the com-
mons32, which appears to be a central aspect in many global crises.
aspects of crises that strengthen personal norms
Antecedents of personal norms—and thus responses to global cri-
ses—differ depending on various aspects of a crisis. Personal val-
ues are an exception since they are relatively stable across one’s life 
course and situations. Factors such as the nature of the onset of a 
crisis, its complexity and the consequences all may influence action 
through the causal paths we have outlined. Our theoretical frame-
work may thereby help explain why responses in some situations are 
more prompt and stronger than for others, and provide key insights 
into what factors could be enhanced to promote actions to mitigate 
global crises. In this section, we discuss aspects of the initial stages 
of the COVID-19 crisis that may have strengthened antecedents 
of personal norms to take action, how these differ for many global 
environmental crises, and perhaps between locations and stages of 
the COVID-19 crisis.
Awareness of consequences. One key aspect that sets the early 
COVID-19 crisis apart from many global environmental crises is 
that its consequences are relatively obvious, easy to understand and 
directly measurable. Moreover, these consequences were clearly 
and widely communicated in many countries where responses to 
COVID-19 were rapid and forceful, and were clearly attributed to 
COVID-19. For instance, many governments and health organiza-
tions communicated the number of persons infected and who had 
died from COVID-19, and presented projections of what might 
happen without individual mitigative action1. This all may explain 
why many people were well aware of COVID-19’s consequences, 
and worried about it33. Consequences of many global environmen-
tal crises are less directly evident, and the processes through which 
these crises lead to adverse outcomes are often subtle, complex and 
are mostly only visible in the long term. Moreover, many metrics of 
global environmental crises (for example, CO2 emissions and eco-
systems threatened) are less directly observable, less familiar and 
seem more spatially, temporally and socially distant than the con-
sequences of COVID-1934,35. Additionally, we conjecture that at the 
initial stages of the pandemic, before it became politicized in some 
countries, trust in public health scientists was higher than trust in 
climate and other environmental scientists36, likely resulting in less 
scepticism about the crisis and more awareness of its consequences.
Roles and responsibilities. The roles and responsibilities of indi-
viduals in the COVID-19 crisis and its mitigation seem to be clearer 
and better defined than in many global environmental crises, which 
likely enhanced ascription of responsibility. For example, when one 
knows the virus spreads through droplets of saliva and discharge 
from the nose, it is relatively self-evident that certain behaviours 
may contribute to the spreading of the virus. For many global envi-
ronmental crises, it is more difficult to understand how one’s actions 
may contribute to the crisis. Many individual actions (for example, 
driving a car or eating meat) impact global environmental crises, 
but the impacts of single individual actions are typically small, indi-
rect and difficult to understand; for instance, requiring an under-
standing of embodied impacts (such as the environmental impacts 
associated with the production, transportation and disposal of a 
product)37. This all likely reduces ascription of responsibility.
Efficacy beliefs. When individuals have a general understanding 
of how the virus spreads, it is also relatively easy to see what actions 
one could take to reduce risks of contracting and spreading the virus 
(for example, hygiene behaviours and maintaining distance), which 
likely enhanced self-efficacy. Moreover, during the early stages of 
the outbreak, a small set of these very concrete and coherent actions 
has been widely and consistently communicated by many national 
governments and health organizations1, which may have further 
strengthened self-efficacy. In contrast, actions that can help miti-
gate global environmental crises are typically highly diverse (for 
example, varying from limiting car use and eating less meat, to buy-
ing more efficient equipment) and less consistently communicated, 
making it more difficult for individuals to understand what actions 
they could and would need to undertake to mitigate global environ-
mental crises, likely limiting their self-efficacy.
In addition, outcome efficacy was likely higher for COVID-19 
than for many global environmental crises. Individuals who engage 
in actions to mitigate COVID-19 directly limit the chance that 
they or others in their close vicinity will be infected. Moreover, the 
effects of such actions when performed collectively (for example, 
via lockdowns, policies and regulations) can be observed and quan-
tified in a relatively short time frame (for example, reduced number 
of infections or rate of spread), making the effectiveness of suc-
cessful measures almost instantly evident. For many global envi-
ronmental crises, effects of mitigative actions will only be visible if 
many others take these actions too, and will only be noticeable in a 
far future, at remote places, which likely reduces outcome efficacy. 
Many actions to mitigate global environmental crises will also only 
be able to reduce the problem, rather than solve it, as many con-
sequences are now already apparent and irreversible (for example, 
climate change and biodiversity loss). Moreover, many processes 
behind global environmental crises continue after action is taken, 
and problems will still increase for a long time, even as mitigation 
efforts unfold38. Additionally, the environmental impact of specific 
individual actions, such as energy-saving behaviours, may not be 
well understood39, creating uncertainties about such actions, which 
may also decrease outcome efficacy.
Social factors. Regions where responses to the pandemic were wide-
spread seemed to convey strong injunctive and descriptive norms to 
take mitigative actions, and to signal that many people—including 
governments and organizations—cared about and worked towards 
the same goal to mitigate the crisis (that is, perceived group val-
ues) (see ref. 40). During lockdowns, regulations required people to 
stay at home, and many places of gathering were temporarily shut. 
Those that stayed open often instituted highly visible practices to 
reduce infection risk of staff and customers. In addition, mitiga-
tive actions were facilitated (for example, free tests), and those who 
were negatively impacted by mitigative actions were supported (for 
example, facilitating working from home and compensating those 
with financial losses). For many global environmental crises, such 
strong, coherent and consistent regulations and norms are missing, 
and people seem to underestimate how much others care about such 
crises and their mitigation18,25. Moreover, it is typically difficult to 
observe and know to what extent others engage in different sustain-
able behaviours as actions are often private, hidden in a larger bun-
dle of practices and no individual is consistently pro-environmental 
in every action23.
Putting things together. In sum, even though there is still much 
that remains unknown, information about COVID-19 and its 
mitigation is relatively easy to understand, and seemed to be com-
municated clearly, consistently and univocally in regions where 
public responses have been rapid and forceful. Moreover, in these 
regions, mitigative actions appeared to receive broad and visible 
support during the crisis’s early onset. In contrast, many global 
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environmental crises are associated with more uncertainties, and 
are communicated and managed in less consistent ways. The uncer-
tainties and inconsistencies associated with global environmental 
crises are partly caused by the more complex nature of such crises, 
and partly by parties opposing mitigative actions for political rea-
sons41,42. Can we learn from those instances where public responses 
to COVID-19 were well-coordinated, rapid and forceful, particu-
larly to more effectively deal with global environmental crises?
What responses to COVID-19 teach us
Based on our theoretical analysis of why in various cases public 
responses to COVID-19 were relatively rapid and forceful compared 
to global environmental crises, we here suggest how antecedents of 
personal norms could be strengthened to promote environmental 
action.
Enhancing general understanding of crises. For many global envi-
ronmental crises, the link between causes and consequences is more 
complex and less self-evident than for COVID-19. This suggests we 
need to strengthen awareness of consequences and ascription of 
responsibility, and thereby promote personal norms and mitigative 
actions. To do so, it may be essential to help people understand the 
system-wide impacts of their actions and associated crises43,44, both 
globally and locally, without making the situation overly complex. 
Many global environmental crises involve complex systems of cause 
and effect, and members of the public are unlikely to follow the 
intricacies of these dynamics. But it may be sufficient to make clear 
what actions are of greatest consequence, and to highlight the most 
critical causal paths and system-wide impacts of these actions and 
associated global crises.
Such strategies may have also further promoted mitigative 
actions during the COVID-19 crisis. Making people aware that 
the pandemic has disruptive impacts on social and economic sys-
tems, along with threatening people’s health, likely strengthened 
individuals’ motivation to act45. Specifically, such understanding 
gives people more diverse reasons to act, which may be particu-
larly relevant for those people less concerned about personal health 
consequences. Similarly, pointing out the wider social, economic 
and national security consequences of global environmental crises 
may strengthen individuals’ motivation to take pro-environmental 
action. This may be particularly critical to motivate those indi-
viduals who care little about the consequences for nature and the 
environment38.
Enhancing personal relevance. Another likely explanation for why 
responses to the early COVID-19 crisis were rapid and forceful in 
some places is that communication made clear that many of the 
outcomes of the crisis were highly personally relevant and mean-
ingful (for example, hospitalizations and deaths, often reported at 
a national or regional level). For many global environmental crises, 
outcomes are considered socially, temporally and spatially remote. 
If these consequences would seem more psychologically close and 
relevant, action is more likely. One way to achieve this is by quan-
tifying the crises with metrics that are more meaningful to people 
(for example, lives threatened, endangered species or natural areas 
lost)38, instead of by the more abstract or physical metrics often 
employed (for example, CO2 emissions and temperature increase). 
Such information likely enhances individuals to acknowledge the 
consequences and worry about them, as individuals become more 
aware that a crisis impacts things or persons they personally value22. 
For instance, worries about plastics may increase when people know 
how plastics affect local ecosystems, the food they consume, and 
their own and others’ health and animals they care about.
Focusing on the impacts that individuals can easily relate to, 
and that affect them personally, may also increase the personal rel-
evance of global environmental crises34,35. In addition to enhancing 
awareness of consequences, such efforts may enhance ascription of 
responsibility and self-efficacy since showing the personal relevance 
of global crises may make individuals’ contributions to a crisis more 
concrete, observable and understandable. Of particular importance 
is demonstrating that actions both as a consumer and as a citizen 
matter.
Highlighting shared prosocial motivation. It is important to 
clearly and widely communicate that many individuals deeply care 
about the lives and things being affected by global environmental 
crises, and strongly support actions to mitigate such crises, as was 
often clear early in the COVID-19 crisis. Such communication may 
be particularly critical to correct common misperceptions about 
others not caring much about nature, the environment and pro-
social action18,25,46 (see subsection ‘Social factors’ in the ‘Aspects of 
crises that strengthen personal norms’ section). These mispercep-
tions may reduce individuals’ outcome efficacy and motivation to 
engage in mitigative actions18, and may restrain action by politicians 
and other leaders to act because of a lack of perceived public sup-
port47. Indeed, making people aware of others’ sustainable actions30 
or a group’s sustainable aims (for example, corporate environmental 
responsibility)48 may motivate individuals to take mitigative actions. 
Such strategies may be particularly powerful for motivating those 
individuals who are not strongly personally motivated25,48. In addi-
tion, highlighting the consensus about the existence of global cri-
ses may counter the effects of ‘disinformation’49, and may thereby 
enhance public engagement in mitigative actions.
Supportive policies and regulations. It is important to note that 
actions by individuals are seldom sufficient to mitigate global crises. 
Actions by governments and the private sector are also essential, as 
they can create conditions that make mitigative actions more fea-
sible and attractive1,38. Early in the COVID-19 crisis, various gov-
ernments and companies supported individuals in taking mitigative 
action (for example, facilitating working from home and home 
deliveries), and compensated those who were hit hardest by mitiga-
tive actions (for example, those who lost income), which may have 
enhanced public engagement in mitigative actions. Similar mea-
sures could be implemented to compensate those who would suf-
fer from mitigating global environmental crises, such as supporting 
fossil-based industries and workers to transition to renewables, and 
facilitating individuals to perform sustainable behaviour and buff-
ering them for increased costs associated with those behaviours50,51. 
As was the case for COVID-19, strong, trusted leadership is needed 
to support mitigative actions at all levels of society38.
Actions by governments and the private sector may also be criti-
cal to increase outcome efficacy and personal norms to take action 
to mitigate global crises. Most global environmental crises can only 
be addressed through multiple mitigative actions taken collectively 
by individuals and groups at all levels of society, but particularly 
by action in economically developed countries. Accordingly, strong 
and concrete commitments to take action from countries and pri-
vate organizations across the world likely enhances individuals’ 
beliefs that their actions will contribute, be impactful and yield posi-
tive effects, instead of giving them the impression that their actions 
are isolated and futile.
Creating win–win situations. COVID-19, global environmental 
crises and the actions to address them interact. For example, dur-
ing lockdowns less motorized travel occurred and less energy was 
used52,53, reducing emissions and bringing wildlife to otherwise 
crowded areas. Yet, COVID-19 mitigation measures also lowered 
the proportion of commuters that use public transportation, which 
over the long run may interfere with environmental goals (that is, 
creating trade-offs)54. Moreover, the economic costs of COVID-19 
mitigation measures may hold people, companies and governments 
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back from investing in sustainability55. Similarly, responses to global 
environmental crises may impact pandemics such as COVID-19. 
Ecosystem alterations and wildlife exploitation increase the likeli-
hood that pandemics occur, suggesting pro-environmental actions 
can prevent future pandemics56–58. Such synergies and trade-offs 
should be carefully considered when designing mitigation strat-
egies, in which mitigation measures with synergies rather than 
trade-offs should be prioritized. Critically, prioritizing win–win 
solutions may not only contribute to solving two (or more) crises 
at once, but may also receive wider support, motivating individuals 
with diverse goals.
Future directions
By employing our theoretical model to analyse the early stages of 
the COVID-19 crisis, we identified what we consider to be key les-
sons learned that could assist with promoting more rapid, forceful 
and effective mitigative actions. These lessons can be treated both as 
tentative guidance for future actions and as hypotheses to be tested. 
There is an urgent need to examine how these crises evolve over 
time, are managed, and how this affects personal norms and their 
antecedents, other relevant factors and mitigative actions. We sug-
gest five main directions for future research.
Variation in strategies across locations. Whereas public responses 
to early outbreaks of COVID-19 were in many places relatively 
rapid and forceful, particularly when compared to other global cri-
ses, this was not the case everywhere. Some of this variation may be 
due to how COVID-19 was managed. Specifically, regional strate-
gies may have differed in how effectively they engaged the factors of 
our theoretical model, which may explain differences in responses. 
For instance, while in many countries messages about COVID-19’s 
outcomes and mitigation were relatively clear and consistent, there 
were also countries in which messages appeared more mixed (for 
example, Brazil, the United Kingdom and the United States), which 
may have lowered awareness of consequences and efficacy beliefs, 
thereby weakening personal norms and mitigative actions. Similarly, 
there has been variation in whether and how countries enforced 
mitigative action. Some countries enforced strict testing proce-
dures and lockdowns, while others relied more on people’s intrinsic 
motivations to engage in advocated mitigative actions, such as the 
personal values and personal norms in our model. Whereas strict 
regulations may be important to ensure rapid change in response 
to a new crisis like COVID-19, we reason based on our theoreti-
cal model that more durable change is unlikely unless regulations 
are internalized into personal norms. Enforcement would therefore 
need to be accompanied with strategies that foster intrinsic motiva-
tion to act, for instance by targeting the different factors of our theo-
retical model. Now is the time to collect data to evaluate the impacts 
of different (combinations of) strategies, and to examine whether 
and how they affect the variables in our theoretical model and, 
thereby, promote mitigative action. Such endeavours will enable 
the identification of key strategies and factors that can most effec-
tively and consistently promote the mitigative actions needed, and 
thereby critically contribute to more effective responses to future 
COVID-19 outbreaks, as well as to other global crises.
Variation in dynamics over time. The COVID-19 crisis hit nations 
hard and suddenly, and although some prospects are improving in 
many places, the future is still highly uncertain and variable across 
countries59. How will aspects of the crisis, and thereby antecedents 
of personal norms, change over time? For instance, as the COVID-
19 crisis continues for a longer period of time, risks may seem more 
gradual, potentially reducing worry and personal norms. Indeed, in 
many countries where infection rates went down, restrictions were 
quickly eased and many people rapidly returned to old practices, 
apparently feeling little moral obligation to continue mitigative 
actions. Some of this may have been the result of efforts to politi-
cize responses, breaking the sense of social consensus. Also, some 
of it may be due to self-interest in returning to life as normal, even-
tually eroding prosocial motivations. Our theoretical framework 
can be used to generate these and other hypotheses about change 
over time. Testing such hypotheses while crises develop may assist 
in selecting strategies to safely ease, or quickly reinforce mitigative 
actions when appropriate.
Expanding the framework. We focused on personal norms and 
their well-established antecedents because of their strong and con-
sistent relationship with mitigative actions. Yet, other factors and 
relationships obviously also play a role in motivating mitigative 
action, and may become more important at other stages of a cri-
sis. Future studies could expand our framework, and further test 
the dynamics between factors. For instance, when many individu-
als start to engage in mitigative actions—possibly because of their 
personal norms—strong descriptive norms to take mitigative action 
may develop18. These descriptive norms may in turn directly, as well 
as indirectly via personal norms, affect mitigative behaviour, par-
ticularly in public settings. Longitudinal data on such responses to 
global crises are needed to test such dynamic relationships, and to 
examine how pathways to action develop over time, which may be 
particularly valuable to develop long-term mitigation strategies.
Testing our framework across crises. Research is needed to spec-
ify the degree to which personal norms and their antecedents are 
engaged across different crises, and whether this explains the differ-
ence in the degree to which mitigative actions are taken. Specifically, 
we need to understand what aspects of crises strengthen which 
antecedents of personal norms and mitigative actions, and to what 
degree the hypothesized relationships generalize across crises. 
Studies comparing responses to different crises while employing 
consistent theoretical frameworks such as ours are essential to iden-
tify effective and generalizable ways to encourage mitigative actions.
Synergies and trade-offs between mitigation goals. Research is 
needed on the system-wide impacts of global crises and their miti-
gative actions. Specifically, systems thinking43,44 teaches us that one 
crisis or mitigative action usually has diverse effects throughout 
coupled human and natural systems. Interdisciplinary research is 
needed to identify these system-wide outcomes, and to develop 
win–win strategies that are beneficial across the board and, when 
that is not possible, to be clear about trade-offs. Such strategies are 
likely to increase public support and adoption rates, which further 
enhances their effectiveness. Of particular importance is paying 
careful attention to equity effects, as both global crises and the miti-
gation efforts developed to respond could have unequal and unjust 
impacts. Yet, recent assessments suggest that many mitigation 
actions have beneficial effects for diverse sustainable development 
goals, which is highly promising for the promotion of sustainable 
action38.
Conclusions
Initial responses to COVID-19 tell us that drastic transforma-
tive change is possible and sometimes acceptable to many indi-
viduals. We propose that certain aspects of the COVID-19 crisis 
strengthened the engagement of personal norms and their anteced-
ents, which may partially explain the rapid and forceful response 
observed. By applying our theoretical framework to the COVID-19 
crisis, we offer insights into ways to motivate the actions needed to 
mitigate other urgent global crises, including global environmental 
crises. Although the individual-level responses of the sort that are 
our focus here are never sufficient to resolve global crises, they can 
be immensely important in shifting the trajectory of a crisis. In turn, 
they must be supported and re-enforced by system-wide action by 
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government and private organizations. Now is the time to refine and 
test theoretical frameworks, such as the one we propose, to under-
stand these crises dynamics.
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